INTRODUCTION
In considering this symposium's subject of how the international community should respond to the challenge of ISIS, I suspect we can agree that it is imperative to be informed by the recent experiences with interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of 4. Traditionally, "prudential" regulation has been regulation focused on the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. Dennis Lockhart, President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Georgia Law Review Symposium: Thoughts on Prudential Regulation of Financial Firms (Mar. 20, 2015) . More recently, and particularly since the financial crisis of 2008, financial supervisory and regulatory efforts have also been focused on protecting the financial system's ability to deliver vital services to the general economy. Id. Regulation of this sort is referred to as "macroprudential" regulation. Id. Regulation of the older sort targeted at individual financial institutions now referred to as "microprudential." JACEK OSIrSKI ET AL., MACROPRUDENTIAL AND MICROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES: TOWARD COHABITATION 6 (2013)..
5.
Titian & Workshop, An Allegory of Prudence (1565), https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/ titian-and-workshop-an-allegory-of-prudence [https//perma.cc/TLZ2-RL2P].
I first encountered the painting as the cover illustration of John Dunn's collection of essays, Interpreting Political Responsibility. in full face, the profile to left of an old man, and the profile to right of a youth."' Above each of the conjoined partial portraits there is a corresponding inscription in Latin, which translated reads: " [Learning] from yesterday, today acts prudently, lest by his action he spoil tomorrow." 7 The title of the painting is "An Allegory of Prudence."" This brief Article makes (or at least gestures toward) three points. First, although the general quality of prudence has long been loosely associated with lawyers, 9 for a discrete period of time in American history (roughly the first two-thirds of the 20th century), one of the most distinctive contributions of a certain type of lawyer-which I will refer to in shorthand as the "New York lawyer-statesman" for historical reasons that will shortly become clear-was the application of prudence not to the practice of law as such, but to the broader domain of U.S. international strategy and policy. Accordingly, the historical part of this Article focuses not on the narrow lawyer's question of 'what was understood as "lawful," but rather on what was distinctively "lawyerly" in these lawyer-statesmen's contributions to international strategy -what I call the quality of "lawyerly prudence."
Second, the circumstances that shaped, allowed, and even encouraged such contributions to international strategy by these lawyers had largely run their course by the last third of the 20th century. While other types of prominent lawyers have remained important in public and private affairs-for example, the "Washington lawyer," ' or the "lawyer's lawyer" found in many cities"n-the specific phenomenon of New York lawyer-statesmen contributing their lawyerly prudence to international strategy more or less ended as a distinctive, socially-reproducing tradition during this time. However we feel about this tradition, my argument goes, that ship has sailed.
Third, international strategy nonetheless remains as much in need of prudence now as ever before 1 2 -arguably more so because of the absence from the scene for the last couple of generations of the lawyerly prudent type. But because New York lawyers can no longer serve as the primary exemplars of lawyerly prudence in this context, we must unpack the elements of the old lawyerly prudence and encourage their self-conscious adoption by a broader group of citizen-statespeople, who have accumulated the kind of direct and relevant experience with what does and does not work in international strategy that is necessary (but not sufficient) to develop and exercise prudence of the old lawyerly kind, even though many or most of such people will not be lawyers. (Feb. 2015) , https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/about-us/press-and-media/press-releases/after-3 -months-and-2 4 4 -donations-frame-appeal-hits-its-target [https://perma.cc/D3QC-B8v6] (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After 3 Months and 244 Donations, Frame Appeal Hits Its Target, NAT'L GALLERY
8. Titian & Workshop, supra note 5. 9. See, e.g., Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 3, at 1573 (" [P] rudence-'good practical wisdom'-is and will continue to be the lawyer's distinctive virtue . . .. ").
10. Edward 0. Lauman et al., Washington Lawyers and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465, 465-66 (1985) .
See generally WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973).

See generally. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, MISSION FAILURE: AMERICAN AND THE WORLD IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (2016).
In short, this Article establishes the need for, and preliminarily describes, a new kind of "post-lawyerly" 3 prudence in international strategy. Fortunately, the international events of the last 15 or so years have left us with a significant pool of people with experiences that make them potential candidates to exercise this postlawyerly prudence.
I.
THREE PERSONAL BUT POSSIBLY ILLUSTRATIVE DATA POINTS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY Since one of the subjects of this symposium is the future of the West's response to ISIS, I will begin with the briefest possible account of three observations from my own experience related to Iraq and Afghanistan. My intention here is not to shift the focus from today and ISIS to the past and other conflicts, but simply to provide illustrative examples of the kind of experience that the concept of prudence demands that we consciously integrate, along with future considerations, in deciding how to act today in response to relevant major international strategic challenges-three data points, if you will. In the interest of time, I will simply set out my three observations. 1 4 The debt restructuring was achieved, first, through international negotiations with country creditors, then through international negotiations with private creditors (and then again through more international negotiations with other country creditors). By most accounts, the debt deal was a rare success of the Iraq effort." However, it is important to note it was carried out largely outside Iraq. Apart from government decisions made in Baghdad at pivotal junctures, much of the work involved took place in locations like Paris, London, Dubai, and Amman, rather than on the ground in Iraq. 1 13. Note that the term "post-lawyerly" is intended to capture the idea of the specified "lawyerly" qualities applying to a broader population, rather than any transcendence of, let alone opposition to, the qualities themselves. See infra, Section IV (describing the need for post-lawyerly prudence).
14. Third and finally, from 2010 to 2012, while working for the U.S. State Department as Embassy Kabul's Governance Policy Chief, I worked with others to shift Afghan and international governance efforts from a scattershot approach pursuing a wide variety of governance objectives at many levels of governance-from tens of thousands of villages to hundreds of districts to 34 provinces-to a more focused approach centered around strengthening the budgetary-governance interface between Afghanistan's central ministries and their provincial institutions. 20 Again, this could only be considered a success in that it walked back international governance objectives that could not be achieved or sustained even at the height of the surge, 2 1 and certainly could not be sustained after the drawdown. 22 And here too, it may have been a case of "too little, too late," as it currently appears that Afghan governance has not been sufficiently strengthened for Afghanistan to fully function as an effective state yet either.
3
With those contemporary points of reference in mind, let me now take a step back in history, to the early and mid-20th century. , Sixteen years ago, in the month of July [1899] , ... I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking for President McKinley, 'The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.' I answered 'Thank the President for me, but say that it is quite absurd, I know nothing about war. I know nothing about the army.' I was told to hold the wire and in a moment there came back the reply, 'President McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for any one who knows anything about war or for any one who knows anything about the army; he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course I had then, on the instant, to determine what kind of lawyer I wished to be, and there was but one answer to make, and so I went to perform a lawyer's duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients, the Government of our country.
17.
Id.
28 Each of these historical factors played a role. I argue, however, that there were also at least four other important elements. I will first outline them schematically then elaborate on them by reference to three illustrative New York lawyer-statesmen.
First, sophisticated corporate lawyers had notable experience with complexity in the real world: Large, far-flung undertakings that involved dealing with multiple and competing agendas and interests, such as continental railroad mergers and reorganizations, an experience of significant practical relevance to America's new global role in the 20th century.
Second and relatedly, corporate lawyers had a heightened awareness of uncertainty inherent in undertakings with many moving parts that interact with each other and frequently produce unintended, emergent effects-perhaps the conditions of international relations par excellence.
Third, well-educated lawyers were better prepared than many of their contemporaries in the policy elite to have some self-conscious appreciation of at least recent history as something that necessarily influences, and constrains the forms of, political change. This is one of the fundamental lessons of common law training: Precedents always have to be considered (even when departing from them).
Fourth, the figures happened to live in an extraordinarily eventful time in which to gather lessons of experience. The demands of the period and the norms of the time conspired such that it was possible for contemporaries to develop a substantial stock of direct experience of strategically consequential events. These days, when we look back historically at pivotal periods of the 20th century, we often focus most on World War II, the creation of the post-war order and institutions, and the so-called "Greatest Generation" involved in these accomplishments. But the key factor that gave rise to the tradition of lawyers acquiring and exercising prudence regarding international strategy actually started earlier, and lay with the contingent historical fact that key individual figures were the right age to be active during the two world wars (as well as during the profound economic challenges of the interwar period).
These elements can be illustrated by just the most skeletal account of three central figures Over the course of the previous two decades, Root had earned a reputation as a brilliant and effective lawyer for some of the period's largest corporate interests, including the Havemeyer sugar refining companies (known as the Sugar Trust) and the many railway-related matters (including mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations) of William C. Whitney, Jay Gould, and E.H. Harriman.
3 4 The Root Clarke firm was among the elite group of New York law firms that, while still intimate by comparison to what they would become in the late 20th century, were developing the sophistication to focus on national and, increasingly, international business.
One of Root Sr.'s biographers described his defining characteristic as having "an extraordinary talent for finding workable solutions to technical and complex problems." In his memoir, Stimson said that of his motivations,
[T]he basic one was that, after preaching preparedness for years and war for months, he could not in conscience remain a civilian. Though in some ways it might be quixotic for a man nearly fifty to become a soldier, it was the only way in which Stimson could feel comfortable in his mind." Two short anecdotes from Elihu Root, Jr.'s life illustrate the experiences that both gave rise to and embodied his lawyerly prudence in international strategy.
The first occurred shortly after the Cunard ocean liner RMS Lusitania was torpedoed and sunk by a German U-boat off the coast of Ireland, killing some 1,200 passengers, including 124 Americans. . When the news made it to New York, on Sunday, May 9, the 34 year-old Root and his partner Clark were scheduled to play golf together in Westchester, New York. 49 But rather than play golf, the two partners ended up engaged in a long and intense conversation about what the tragedy meant for the United States's future role in the war raging in Europe, which led them both to the conclusion that "inaction was intolerable."'o With Clark taking the lead, Root and a dozen other lawyers and professional men gathered the next evening in Root Clark's downtown office to prepare a public statement." The following day a larger group of such prominent professional men met over lunch at the Harvard Club to form a formal committee pledging support for a more internationally engaged role for the country. Finally, following consultations with the well-known Army General Leonard Wood, the committee proposed that a military training camp for college students scheduled to take place that summer in Plattsburg, upstate New York, be adapted to train older professional men such as lawyers and bankers between the ages of 30 and 40 (the "Business Men's Camp"), to serve as the nucleus of an officer corps in the event the United States required a large-scale popular mobilization to enter World War L" In due course, the proposal of Clark, Root, and their like-minded New York professional (and social) peers was accepted by the government, and the first training camp at Plattsburg took place from August 8 to September 6, 1915.54 This novel citizen-soldier initiative (which was repeated in 1916) became known as the Plattsburg Movement and, following the Selective Service Act of 1917, did in fact provide many of the officers mobilized for service in Europe once the U.S. entered the war." During the war, Clark worked in the office of the Adjutant General, which was responsible for mobilizing the wartime force with the rank of lieutenant colonel." Root served in the Allied Expeditionary Force as a major in the 304th Infantry" (and with both Root and Clark taken away by the war from their still young law firm, Elihu Root, Sr., having recently completed his term as a U.S. volunteered to help cover the firm's business in their absence -about which Clark later said, " [t] he truth is that the Senator pretty much set us up in business. His prestige was enormous and his kindness and interest in us beyond measure.")."
The second anecdote illustrating Elihu Root, Jr.'s lawyerly prudence in international strategy came more than 25 years later, in the midst of World War II. In late 1942, the highest levels of the U.S. civilian and military war leadership were consumed with intense debates about both the relative priority that should be assigned to the different theaters of the conflict (i.e., Europe vs. the Mediterranean vs. the Pacific) and the relative effectiveness of (and thus the resources that should be devoted to) the different arms of the military (i.e., army, air forces, navy) in prosecuting a campaign in the main theaters.
5 9 Perhaps the most pressing question to be resolved was the most effective way to prepare to invade and retake continental Europe. To help answer this question, the most senior leaders of the Army Air Forces (AAF) decided to convene a small, outside group to analyze how a sustained air campaign against strategic targets in western Europe might most effectively degrade the German war effort sufficient to enable a successful ground invasion.
6 o Notwithstanding the existing intelligence and analytical resources already available to the AAF, the leaders were interested in getting a new perspective 65 and were intrigued by the nascent idea of "operations research," which involved careful analysis of interactions within networks.
62 They believed both that AAF personnel lacked the background to conduct 63 such analysis and that a certain kind of civilian might be better equipped to do so. Specifically, the AAF sought "civilians with considerable experience in analyzing large, complex problems." 64 Accordingly, the AAF officers charged with setting up this committee 6 ' ended up assembling a group including a disproportionate number of New York corporate lawyers, and the first person they turned to was none other than Elihu Root, Jr., then 62 years old.
Also invited to join the group, which was to become known as the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA), were: Fowler Hamilton, former Department of Justice antitrust lawyer turned "economic warfare" expert who a few years later would be among the founders of the Root Clark offshoot firm still known today as Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; and Major Barton 
68
(then 73), who for some 30 years had been the international face of J.P. Morgan.
The activities, conclusions, and impact of this Committee of Operations Analysts 6 9 (which, it must be noted, also included a number of non-lawyer, active duty AAF officers) are for another article. 7 0 But one general observation about Elihu Root, Jr.'s work on the COA is relevant to our argument. In his first-hand account of the experience, Major Perera (the Executive Officer) specifically noted Root Jr.'s awareness of the inherent limitations in analysts' ability to fully predict the result of the interactions between Allied forces' successful targeting of one part of a complex system and the Axis forces' reactions to the damage done.
I recall [Mr. Root's] prophetic statement that it was impossible to determine in advance what man's ingenuity might accomplish when faced with desperate necessity. We could never conjure up all of the methods the enemy would devise to repair the damage inflicted on his vital targets, to substitute other products for those being produced there or even to manage to get along without such products. 
70.
Such an article could also describe the periodic bureaucratic tensions between (1) the COA commissioned by HQ AAF in Washington; (2) 
Id.
Perera also connected this awareness of inherent uncertainty that follows from interactive complexity to Root's humility: "Elihu Root, Jr., was a very modest man but his modesty was in no sense affected; it was securely based on a thorough and penetrating intellect and a flawless character." 7 3 In 1945, Elihu Root, Jr. was awarded the highest civilian decoration, the Medal for Merit, for his work on the Committee of Operational Analysts. 74 Perera's memoir reproduces a photo of the ceremony showing Root with Fowler Hamilton, Barton Leach and himself (all lawyers), and reprints a letter from Root to him saying "there should have been four medals or none, for if four men ever worked in complete and unstratified equality you and Bart and Fowler and I did during our years on the steering committee of the COA." ' Here also we will satisfy ourselves with two anecdotes that illustrate how he acquired and exercised lawyerly prudence in international affairs.
Entering Amherst College in 1912, McCloy completed his junior year in May
1915 and sought out the opportunity to attend the four-week military training camp for college students at Plattsburg referred to earlier. After completing training, he requested to remain for the "Business Men's Camp" beginning the next week, where he was exposed to many of the elite lawyers and businessmen who had responded to Grenville Clark and Elihu Root's call. 7 8 After graduating from Amherst in 1916, he again attended the business men's camp at Plattsburg, where he may have met firsttime attendee Henry Stimson. In the fall of 1916, McCloy entered Harvard Law School, where he crossed paths with many men already on the fast track to a prominent career in law, including Dean Acheson and Leo Gottlieb, but was himself only a middling student.o Over the course of his first year at the law school, news of the war in Europe became increasingly grave. McCloy then pursued a career as a corporate lawyer in New York, working first for the well-regarded but somewhat .sleepy firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, and then transferring after three years to the city's most advanced law firm, the Cravath firm.
1 Cravath represented the vanguard of the modern "law factory," where a small number of experienced senior lawyers each trained and put to work groups of junior associates, and transmitted the firm culture of a rigid insistence on excellence.92 McCloy went on to practice at Cravath for nearly 20 years, finding both intellectually rewarding legal work and the opportunity to live and travel widely abroad.
3 He even occasionally worked on issues with an international and public dimension, as with the extended investigation he conducted into the responsibility for a notorious 1916 explosion of a U.S. Germany from 1949-1952. Exploring these topics, however, must be left to other articles or books.'" But among the things that particularly marked McCloy (and Elihu Root, Jr. and Henry Stimson) as exemplary was his (and their) exceptional ability to move from the private practice of law at the highest levels in New York to the public practice of international strategy at the highest levels in Washington and throughout the world -and not just once, but during multiple periods of extraordinary strategic consequence. In other words, McCloy, Root, and Stimson did not just begin as New York lawyers and then get pulled permanently into the Washington policy orbit. Instead, after completing their public service during periods of maximum need, they returned to New York to resume exercising their lawyerly abilities in the distinctive setting of private legal practice-and all three of these figures did this at least twice (and often more than that) as the nation moved from WWI to the interwar period, and then to WWII and the postwar period. By contrast, most of their contemporaries who experienced even some of these momentous events usually left the next crisis to subsequent generations, as they often followed a pattern of either moving permanently from their original professional base to Washington after initially being called to it by a major event like a world war, or performing a finite period of public service and then returning home for good.
101
D. An Underappreciated Key to the New York Lawyer-Statesman Tradition:
Living in Uniquely "Interesting Times"'
02
Notwithstanding the inherent drama of even brief accounts of these three exemplary New York lawyer-statesmen, the point most relevant to the argument of this Article is less about what they did than it is about when and how they did it. It is by no means a coincidence that I selected three New York lawyer-statesmen who each served in various capacities (reflecting in part their different ages during the key years) in both World War I and World War II. One of the reasons Stimson, Root, Jr., and McCloy were able to acquire the experience they did is almost shockingly straightforward: They simply were born in just the right narrow window of time -the less than 30 years between 1867 and 1895.'03 Aside from their individual qualities, this fact was necessary for them to see more, do more, and learn more through direct experience about what does and does not work in truly consequential international strategy than lawyer-statesmen before or since. 
III. THE FALL OF LAWYERLY PRUDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
One can see some continuing, partly second-hand echoes of this rare experience in the next generation 1 0 4 of lawyers who learned at the feet of the "double world war" generation. Consequently, the influence continued with people born during the first decade or two of the 20th century. 05 (1994) . But I want to suggest that a resolution of these academic debates is unnecessary for the argument of this Article, which is not chiefly concerned with the lessons different generations (however defined) may or may not have drawn from different experiences. My focus here is instead on trying to tease out a common sensibility possessed by a select group of individuals who (1) shared a common formative professional training and practice as New York corporate lawyers during a period roughly bounded by the first four decades of the 20th century and (2) were directly involved as soldiers and officials in both of the two world wars-thus allowing them, in effect, to serve as members of something like a single, unusually extended, generation. While the juxtaposition of these two pivotal sets of experiences is my own, I am greatly indebted to the work of legal historian Robert W. Gordon for my understanding of the distinctive professional ethos of elite New York legal practice of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including the emphasis on the ideal of the "citizen lawyer." To take just one example from his many articles over the past three decades touching on this broad subject, in his 1988 article, Gordon describes as arguably "a true Golden Age compared to the present" the period 1900-1975-which world war-learned and war-tested lawyerly prudence described here had significantly faded by the time we got to the generation whose direct strategic experience was oriented solely around WWII, rather than both world wars.
I want to avoid psychoanalyzing these figures, so I leave my comment on this "WWII only" generation at this: Perhaps it was possible for someone to have one "good" world war-one in which things seemed to go more or less the right way (eventually). But from my study of the experience of the "double world war" generation (consistent with my own lesser experience), it seems exponentially harder to have had two "good" world wars 10 6 (recall the sentiment attributed to Elihu Root, Jr. at the end of WWII: "[I]t was impossible to determine in advance what man's ingenuity might accomplish when faced with desperate necessity."o'). Instead, that uniquely intensive degree of experience seemed to have almost inevitably underscored the difficulty of fully predicting or controlling the consequences of large-scale international actions,' and to have underscored the power of not only intended but also unintended consequences.109
In any case, by the 1960s the social factors that had supported a special role for lawyerly prudence in U.S. foreign and national security policy and international strategy had undergone some significant changes. First was the rise of new disciplinary competitors in the policy elite with their own claims to special expertise on international matters, most notably economists and political scientists." 0 Second, Department during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and as Secretary of State during the Carter administration). After that, however, the transmission seems to grow unavoidably faint. While many lawyers born after WWI obviously still established impressive legal practices in a proliferating number of U.S. metropolitan centers apart from New York-including Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and eventually most of the nation's biggest cities-by the time they came to maturity there appears to have been less of an accepted pattern of back-and-forth movement to Washington. Infra note 119. Consequently, it became more common for ambitious lawyers either to move to Washington and not return or to simply resist the temptation of Washington in the first place.
106. Relevant to this theme generally is an observation by the theologian and nationally influential realist foreign policy commentator during the early post-WWII period Reinhold Niebuhr, who noted in a 1956 preface to a book of his originally published in 1929:
As the self-revelations of a young parson [these notes] express the then typical notions of liberal Protestantism before the whole liberal world view was challenged by world events. Of course they were written after the first world war. But that war did not essentially challenge the liberal culture of America. It required a depression and another world war to corrode an optimism in America which was lost in Europe after the first world war.
Washington developed as an economic and cultural ecosystem in its own right."' While Washington did not necessarily become less dependent on importing talented lawyers (and other professionals) from New York and other major cities, the growth of Washington's economy made it less necessary and less attractive for those imported professionals to return to where they came from after investing time and effort learning how government and Washington worked.
1 12 In short, what had been a "twoway ticket" between New York and Washington, D.C. for our exemplary New York lawyer-statesman into the 1960s now increasingly became a "one-way ticket."
Third, partly in response to the previous two changes, New York and other nonWashington lawyers tactically began to cede the territory of international policy and strategic matters to Washington, and instead increasingly focused their efforts on issues with a more obvious legal dimension."
3 In their chapter Law, Lawyers, and Empire,11 4 Garth and Dezelay describe the process by which New York lawyers interested in international policy gradually shifted their emphasis from strategic questions to fields such as international human rights law and international commercial arbitration that could be more easily protected as the inherent preserve of lawyers and kept to a greater extent in New York."' Fourth, the pace required of lawyers working for rich and demanding financial sector clients on Wall Street increased to such a degree that it required a virtually total commitment by ambitious lawyers, leaving New York lawyers working in big firms in the 1970s with little time to think about international strategy and straddle the Northeast corridor between New York and Washington, except on client business. Let me close by returning to the specific context for the question of the contemporary utility of prudence in international strategy presented by this symposium: How we should best learn from our relevant recent experiences with interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region in deciding a current strategy for responding to the challenge of ISIS, while giving due consideration for the future. The first part of my argument has been an indirect one: That the most effective way for us to meet the ISIS challenge-or really any strategic-level international problem, private as well as public, and economic as well as political or military -is to identify people with the background and qualities to approach strategic challenges in a manner comparable to that which the New York lawyer-statesmen we've discussed might have used-namely, in a lawyerly prudent matter that, as in Titian's painting, learns from the experience of the past, and acts prudently in the present, to avoid spoiling tomorrow.
However, the other part of my historical argument has been that for overdetermined reasons, the tradition of "lawyerly prudence" in international strategy, practiced as I've described it here, is now, in essence, a dead letter.
Consequently, the final questions we are left with are: (1) Whether any or all of the elements of lawyerly prudence are still valuable, and (2) if so, can they exist and be cultivated in a broader group of citizen-statespeople who have acquired relevant, comparably intense experience?
To answer this, recall the fundamental qualities of lawyerly prudence sketched out near the beginning of this Article and illustrated through the accounts of our three New York lawyer-statesmen: (1) Experience with the complexity that follows from national and international scale activity, in matters public and private; (2) a heightened awareness of the uncertainty inherent in complex (especially international) undertakings, and from that, a humble recognition that the consequences of actions cannot always be predicted or controlled;" 9 (3) appreciation of at least recent history as something that necessarily influences, and constrains the forms of, political change; 1 20 and (4) a substantial store of direct experience of strategically consequential events.
John Anderson-in the heat of the primaries, when it appeared he might have a chance-called John McCloy (as political figures have been doing for forty years) and asked for some advice. He wanted the name of someone in the Stimson-Acheson-McCloy tradition, someone experienced in the corporate establishment and yet wise in international affairs, a Wall Street lawyer who might make a good secretary of state. McCloy hardly paused to think before answer: "You won't find one. Those lawyers don't exist anymore. They're all too busy making money."
Id.
119. The great international relations scholar Hans Morgenthau taught us that international relations requires no less than "cosmic humility," because " [t] o know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular situation is quite another." Hans J. Morgenthau 587 (2014) (discussing the ways uncertainty and indeterminacy leads to tragic choices where a decision maker must decide, even while knowing that he or she lacks full knowledge of the consequences of his or decision).
120. Note that a lawyerly appreciation of at least the recent past (because the past is one of the constraints
In fact, this last element was the spur to my first insight that eventually led to this Article: When it occurred to me that if direct experience of strategically consequential events is a necessary condition for prudence, a significant number of our contemporaries today have already accumulated quite a significant store of strategically significant experience since September 2001, and done so during an even more compressed period than the double war generation-15 years versus 30. To put it differently, the contingent historical fact that we were born when we were and thus ended up in a position to experience the big strategic events of the last 15 years at least gives us a shot at recreating a version of the old lawyerly prudence. While we have not had two world wars, we have had two fairly large-scale (by contemporary standards) regional interventions, as well as many smaller interventions, and a wide range of ongoing war-like activities (and this is to say nothing of the potentially even more strategically consequential international financial crises since 2008). My original question was: Can we take advantage of this opportunity? Is it possible for a critical mass of people today to also embrace the other elements of lawyerly prudence and then pull the pieces together into a coherent and self-conscious sensibility that might serve (with appropriate updates as necessary) as a kind of new (or post-) lawyerly prudence for our time?
So far, the record has not been particularly encouraging. As a final personal data point, eight years ago I gave a talk at New York Law School based on my experiences to that point in Iraq, on what I thought were the mistakes and lessons (on the civilian side) of the Iraq intervention.1 2 ' Nonetheless, just a couple of years later, I found myself in Afghanistan trying to undo some strategy mistakes that sometimes seemed eerily similar.12 Nonetheless, I think it is possible to leave us in at least a potentially optimistic place about the future of a "post-lawyerly prudence." While it is true that the group that exemplified these distinctive qualities in the past-namely lawyers who were products of the distinctive professional training, legal practice, and war-time experiences described here -have become, since roughly the last third or quarter of the 20th century, unable to bear the same responsibility for exemplifying the qualities that they did 100, 75, or even 50 years ago, it is also true that the challenging on the future) is distinct from a true historian's detailed knowledge of history for its own sake. As such, the level of knowledge of the past necessary for lawyerly prudence is a much less demanding standard than has sometimes been suggested by eminent historians. . This is a thought-provoking idea, but I mention it only to make clear that the understanding of the past I have discussed here is quite explicitly the less-demanding level of understanding of a well-educated lawyer rather than that of a trained historian. While knowledge of the past has inherent value and almost always has some use, to be lawyerly prudent one only has to know enough about the past to have some sensitivity to the kinds of pitfalls that might jeopardizing the future. international events of the last 15 years have provided the opportunity for the creation of new groups of citizen-statespeople whose international strategic judgment, like that of their lawyer-statesmen predecessors, has been forged in part by direct experience in multiple international strategic crises. And the direct experience of these crises has given these select citizen-statespeople the raw material with which it might yet be possible to self-consciously formulate a new sensibility of prudence: One that begins with the key components of the old lawyerly prudence -experience with complexity; awareness of inherent uncertainty and the related imperative of humility; appreciation of at least the recent past; and last but not least, a constantly-interrogated store of the hard-earned lessons of experiences over the last 15 years -and then adds to these any new components called for by the particularities of our own era. If we think what I've called lawyerly prudence was useful in the past, perhaps the least that can be said is that post-lawyerly prudence is worth a try in the present.
